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Abstract 
Arousal theory as discussed within the present paper refers to those mechanisms and neural systems involved in 
central nervous system activation and more specifically the systems involved in cortical activation. Historical progress 
in the evolution of arousal theory has led to a better understanding of the functional neural systems involved in 
arousal or activation processes and ultimately contributed much to our current theories of emotion. Despite evidence 
for the dynamic interplay between the left and right cerebral hemispheres, the concepts of cerebral balance and 
dynamic activation have been emphasized in the neuropsychological literature. A conceptual model is proposed 
herein that incorporates the unique contributions from multiple neuropsychological theories of arousal and emotion. 
It is argued that the cerebral hemispheres may play oppositional roles in emotion partially due to the differences in 
their functional specializations and in their persistence upon activation. In the presence of a threat or provocation, 
the right hemisphere may activate survival relevant responses partially derived from hemispheric specializations in 
arousal and emotional processing, including the mobilization of sympathetic drive to promote heightened blood 
pressure, heart rate, glucose mobilization and respiratory support necessary for the challenge. Oppositional processes 
and mechanisms are discussed, which may be relevant to the regulatory control over the survival response; however, 
the capacity of these systems is necessarily limited. A limited capacity mechanism is proposed, which is familiar within 
other physiological systems, including that providing for the prevention of muscular damage under exceptional 
demand. This capacity theory is proposed, wherein a link may be expected between exceptional stress within a neural 
system and damage to the neural system. These mechanisms are proposed to be relevant to emotion and emotional 
disorders. Discussion is provided on the possible role of currently applied therapeutic interventions for emotional 
disorders.
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Over the last decade, research on emotion and arousal 
has shifted towards an integration of these constructs 
(Hagemann et  al. 2003; Williamson and Harrison 2003; 
see Harrison 2015). This integration has presented 
the opportunity for controversy over the operational 
definitions of these constructs (Panksepp 2000), as well 
as controversy over certain assumptions involved in the 
study of emotion (Davidson 2003), both suggesting the 
need for more comprehensive models of emotion and 
arousal. The purpose of this review is not to pit any two 
perspectives against each other, rather the purpose of this 
paper is to trace through the logical development and 
progression of arousal/activation theory as it has been 
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influenced through multiple eras of research regarding 
emotion.
The review begins by defining the functional cerebral 
systems approach and classic arousal theory. Promi-
nent models of emotion that stemmed from arousal 
theory include the right hemisphere model, the valence 
and balance models, models of approach and avoidance, 
and dynamic activation models. Each of these models 
provides a unique contribution to the understanding of 
the functional cerebral systems of emotion and arousal. 
The integration that follows will present the utilities 
and limitations of each major theory and incorporate 
these elements into a proposed model of emotion and 
arousal. Moreover, this integration may provide for a bet-
ter understanding of the processes involved in emotions 
such as hostility and fear, arousal related processes, and 
sympathetic processes including heart rate, blood pres-
sure, and glucose metabolism.
Classic arousal theory
The key to understanding how emotion and arousal are 
intertwined lies in functional cerebral systems theory. 
Within neuropsychology, functional cerebral systems 
theory, as proposed by Luria (1966), see (Harrison 2015), 
can be considered the equivalent of Einstein’s Theory 
of Relativity within the field of physics. This framework 
promotes the systematic exploration of functional inter-
actions within the nervous system and has provided 
unsurpassed explanatory value and testability. On a 
behavioral level, research stemming from this theory has 
reported close associations between activation states of 
emotion and arousal. Likewise, neurobiological research 
has included the same cortical and subcortical structures 
when describing autonomic and emotional systems.
At the heart of Luria’s functional cerebral systems the-
ory (Luria 1966) are Luria’s three principle functional 
units of the brain (Luria 1973). Luria proposed an organi-
zation of cerebral systems in which multiple units of the 
brain are connected through a functional hierarchy. The 
first functional unit is comprised of the brainstem reticu-
lar formation and is responsible for altering cortical tone 
and arousal. The second functional unit is comprised of 
the parietal, occipital, and temporal regions of the cortex, 
responsible for the reception, analysis, and comprehen-
sion of sensory information. The third functional unit is 
comprised of the anterior regions of the hemispheres (the 
frontal lobes) responsible for planning and sequencing, 
and regulatory control. Furthermore, multiple regions 
in different parts of the brain may be involved in simi-
lar tasks, and the activation of these areas will be similar 
across individuals.
Luria reported that “the nervous system as we know, 
always exhibits a certain tone of activity, and the 
maintenance of this tone is an essential feature of all bio-
logical activity. However, situations exist in which this 
ordinary tone is insufficient, and must be raised. These 
situations are the primary sources underlying activation” 
(Luria 1973, p. 52). Luria’s unique approach to explain-
ing the functional interactions within the nervous system 
has been the framework of neuropsychological models 
of emotion and arousal. However, the application of this 
theoretical approach is incomplete. Understanding how 
the brain processes and acts on emotion, arousal, and 
various other processes is an active, cutting edge area of 
research at the present time.
Perhaps the most notable feature of functional cerebral 
systems theory is that it moved away from the notion of 
strict localization and toward a more systematic view of 
cerebral systems. Earlier efforts to explain the functional 
anatomy behind emotion had focused on the limbic sys-
tem (Heilman et  al. 1985; Papez 1937). Similarly, initial 
efforts to explain the biological proponents of arousal 
focused on the sympathetic and parasympathetic pro-
cesses in the periphery. Such approaches were removed 
from Luria’s functional cerebral systems theory and the 
methods that followed from Luria’s theory shifted focus 
to the interconnectivity of the cerebral, brainstem, and 
cerebellar systems (Davidson 1993). This novel approach 
within neuropsychology, neurology, and psychophysiol-
ogy led to prominent models of emotion and arousal.
A precursor to functional cerebral systems theory and 
likely the most fundamental theory underlying emotional 
processing within neuropsychology is Arousal Theory. 
Historically, research on arousal explored the relation-
ships between the frontal lobes and the brainstem. The 
classic arousal literature focused on the diffuse projec-
tions of the mesencephalic reticular formation. Arousal 
theory was built upon research focused on the electrical 
stimulation of the reticular formation in the brainstem, 
which was found to result in the activation of higher level 
ipsilateral brain regions (Moruzzi and Magoun 1949). 
This revealed that the neural network that originates in 
the brainstem modulates the activation and arousal level 
of the ipsilateral hemisphere. The arousal systems of the 
reticular formation share connections with the anterior 
cerebral regions, which allow the frontal lobes to provide 
control over this system. Activation of this arousal system 
has been associated with cortical arousal (as evidenced 
by desynchronized EEG) (Moruzzi and Magoun 1949), 
behavioral arousal (e.g. wakefulness), and peripheral 
arousal through sympathetic measures (Lindsley 1960). 
Similarly, deactivation of this system has been associated 
with sleep, comatose states, and large amplitude, slow 
wave EEG.
Further research revealed that the activation of this 
system could also be regulated through manipulations 
Page 3 of 21Comer et al. SpringerPlus  (2015) 4:345 
in sensory input (Isaac 1960). In studies of nonhuman 
primates, ambient light and sound levels were found 
to directly alter arousal levels. Isaac and Devito (1958) 
found that reducing sensory input into the reticular for-
mation improved the arousal irregularities that resulted 
from a prefrontal lobectomy. Shortly after, Isaac coined 
the term “arousal inhibitor”, describing the function of 
the frontal lobes.
Just as the reticular formation projects primarily to 
activate ipsilateral brain regions, the prefrontal regions 
exert their regulatory influence over the ipsilateral sen-
sory and arousal regions, such that the right hemisphere 
regulatory capacity is strongest for the right sensory 
region (Knight et  al. 1999). The frontal lobes have also 
been shown to modulate arousal components of sensory 
threshold (Harrell and Isaac 1969; Kallman and Isaac 
1976) and modulate habituation to auditory and soma-
tosensory stimulation (Butter 1964; Rule et  al. 2002). 
Given the interface between the ipsilateral frontal lobes 
and reticular activating system, Luria (1966) noted that it 
was often difficult to distinguish frontal lobe dysfunction 
from brainstem and deep subcortical impairments. A 
major contribution of classic arousal theory and this early 
body of research on arousal is that it provided a basis for 
two separate arousal systems with the frontal lobes pro-
viding regulatory control. However, this line of research 
did not account for the asymmetry that exists between 
the arousal systems of the left and right hemispheres.
The right hemisphere model
Arousal theory underwent a revolutionary change 
when Heilman and Van Den Abell (1980) posited that 
arousal should not be a symmetrical system, but rather 
that arousal should be lateralized differentially to the 
right brain. This followed Heilman and Van Den Abell’s 
(1979) right hemisphere model, which was originally 
derived from observing individuals with brain damage in 
either the right or left hemisphere (Heilman et al. 1975). 
Patients with right hemisphere lesions were found to 
have slower reaction times than patients with left hemi-
sphere lesions. Consistent findings were demonstrated 
when normal subjects were shown to have faster reac-
tion times to stimuli presented in the left hemispace than 
stimuli presented in the right hemispace (Heilman and 
Van Den Abell 1979). As a part of the right hemisphere 
model, Heilman incorporated the findings of previous 
research (Dimond and Beaumont 1973) that suggested 
that the left hemisphere performs vigilance tasks at a 
high level initially, but then declines, whereas the right 
hemisphere performs at an inferior but consistent level, 
thereby sustaining vigilance. Similarly, Konigsmark et al. 
(1958) and others (Moruzzi and Magoun 1949) had pre-
viously noted that the electrical stimulation of the right 
mesencephalic reticular formation resulted in activation 
that persisted longer than similar electrical stimulation of 
the left reticular formation.
The right hemisphere model posits that the right hemi-
sphere plays a greater role in arousal consistent with its 
dominance in processing emotions regardless of valence 
(Heilman 1982). Sympathetic reactions to emotional 
events are also associated with right hemisphere activa-
tion, which is said to be the primary anatomical location 
for emotional comprehension and emotional expression 
(Heilman 1997). Such emotional dominance logically fol-
lows from the right hemisphere dominance for regulating 
bilateral cortical arousal levels (Howes and Boller 1975; 
Green and Hamilton 1976; Heilman et al. 1978; Heilman 
and Van Den Abell 1979; Heller 1993), as any intense emo-
tion requires arousal or activation. Moreover, evidence 
exists for subliminal emotions (e.g., Gainotti 2012; Johnson 
2005), where subcortical and brainstem mechanisms are 
involved in emotional processing. Regardless, of the level 
of analysis, the lateralization of emotion preferentially to 
the right cerebral hemisphere was presented numerous 
times within the literature by Heilman et al. (1985, 2003), 
Heilman and Bowers (1990), Heilman and Gilmore (1998) 
as well as others (Borod et  al. 1983; Borod 1992; Bryden 
and Ley 1983; Buck 1984; Ross 1985; Tucker 1981a, b).
The notion of right hemispheric specialization for emo-
tion can be traced back to Mills (1912a, b), who noted 
that patients with right hemisphere lesions displayed 
decreased emotional expression, and Babinski (1914), 
who reported that such patients were often indifferent. 
Also, patients with right temporoparietal lesions exhib-
ited deficits in comprehending the emotional affect of 
speech (Heilman et  al. 1975). While much of the early 
work leading up to the right hemisphere model focused 
primarily on the posterior regions of the cortex, espe-
cially the parietal lobes (Denny-Brown et  al. 1952), 
researchers subsequently expanded its application into 
the frontal lobes (Heilman et  al. 1993). This work lends 
itself to suggest that the right hemisphere maintains an 
excitatory role over the reticular activating system, and 
the left hemisphere possibly portrays an inhibitory role 
over the right hemisphere or the reticular activating sys-
tem (Heilman 1997). Support for this notion has been 
found in patients with right-frontal lobe damage who 
have decreased regulatory control over emotions, (Heil-
man et  al. 1993; Robinson et  al. 1993; see Shenal et  al. 
2003, for a comprehensive review). Such right frontal 
lobe dysfunction is also associated with hyperarousal, as 
there is diminished regulatory control over the reticular 
formation via the descending projections as well as less 
regulatory control over the right posterior brain regions 
via the longitudinal tract (Shenal et  al. 2003; Carmona 
et al. 2009; Foster et al. 2008).
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Support for the right hemisphere model has grown to 
include right hemisphere dominance during emotional 
provocation (Borod et al. 1988; Tucker et al. 1977) and in 
the comprehension and expression of emotional prosodic 
speech (Borod et al. 1992, 1998, 2000, 2002; Bowers et al. 
1987; Emerson et al. 1999; Heilman et al. 1975; Schmitt 
et al. 1997). Additionally, there is evidence for right hemi-
sphere specialization in the perception of negative emo-
tional faces (Herridge et  al. 2004; Mandel et  al. 1991; 
Wittling and Roschmann 1993) and in the expression of 
emotional facial gestures (Borod et  al. 1997; Herridge 
et al. 2004; Rhodes et al. 2000).
Support also comes from findings that the left hemi-
sphere attends to primarily right-sided stimuli, whereas 
the right hemisphere attends to stimuli within either 
hemispace (Heilman and Van Den Abell 1980). In the 
vast literature on neglect disorders, research findings are 
consistent that left hemispatial neglect is far more com-
mon than right hemispatial neglect, due to the atten-
tional specialization of the right hemisphere (Heilman 
et  al. 2003). Similarly, Borod (1992) suggests that these 
nonverbal, spatial, and integrative abilities of the right 
hemisphere give this hemisphere an advantage for pro-
cessing emotions (see also Hagemann et al. 2005).
While studies of individuals with brain damage pro-
vide an understanding of the functional systems under-
lying emotion (Borod 1993; see Hagemann et  al. 2005), 
research in non-brain damaged populations also yields 
information supporting the right hemisphere model. 
Consistent with studies of hemispatial neglect, high-hos-
tile participants identified facial affect faster when faces 
were presented to the left visual field (right hemisphere) 
than to the right visual field (Harrison and Gorelczenko 
1990). The literature on chimeric faces has provided 
robust evidence for the right hemisphere advantage for 
emotions (Levy et  al. 1983; Bourne and McKay 2014). 
Likewise, in the auditory modality, a left ear advantage 
(right hemisphere) has been found for emotion identifi-
cation (Bryden and MacRae 1989).
Electrophysiological and neuroimaging studies provide 
useful information regarding the right hemisphere spe-
cialization for emotion processing. Herridge et al. (2004) 
asked high-hostile participants to make angry facial 
expressions and found that the galvanic skin response 
(GSR) of these individuals was heightened and prolonged 
at the left hemibody (right hemisphere). Studies utiliz-
ing electroencephalography (EEG) have yielded greater 
relative right hemisphere activity during the processing 
of facial affect (Kestenbaum and Nelson 1992; Munte 
et  al. 1998; Vanderploeg et  al. 1987) and the processing 
of the emotional components of speech (Bostanov and 
Kotchoubey 2004; Everhart et  al. 2003). More recent 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies 
have found similar evidence for the right hemisphere’s 
involvement in the perception of facial emotion (Naru-
moto et al. 2001; Sato et al. 2004) and affective prosody 
(Buchanan et al. 2000; George et al. 1996; Imaizumi et al. 
1997).
In a review of the literature, Silberman and Wein-
gartner (1986) concluded that the largest amount of 
consistency supported the right hemisphere being domi-
nant for emotion. There is abundant evidence supporting 
the notion that the perceptual and expressive processes 
regarding emotion, as well as the autonomic arousal 
processes, are asymmetrically represented in the cer-
ebral hemispheres. Recent literature reviews of depres-
sion and other related studies continue to lend support 
to the model (Carmona et al. 2009; Demaree et al. 2005; 
Holland et al. 2014; Mollet and Harrison 2006; Kopp and 
Wessel 2008; Shenal et al. 2003; see also Harrison 2015).
The valence and balance models
Differential hemispheric specialization for emotion dates 
back to Goldstein (1939), who reported “catastrophic 
reaction” in patients with left hemisphere lesions whereas 
patients with right hemisphere lesions were indifferent or 
euphoric. As support for the theories regarding arousal 
began to grow, theories pertaining to the left hemi-
sphere’s involvement in emotion followed shortly after 
and led to a second major Hypothesis. In contrast to the 
right hemisphere model, the valence model posits that 
the right hemisphere is specialized for negative emotion 
and that the left hemisphere is specialized for positive 
emotion (Ehrlichman 1987; Silberman and Weingartner 
1986; Borod 1992; Buck 1984; Heilman and Bowers 1990; 
Ross 1985). This model postulates that the right hemi-
sphere is dominant in processing and expressing nega-
tive emotions and that the left hemisphere is dominant in 
processing and expressing positive emotions.
Before the valence model, evidence for right hemi-
sphere involvement in negative emotion was plentiful. 
However evidence for left hemisphere involvement in 
positive emotion was more difficult to derive. For exam-
ple, Dimond et  al. (1976) presented motion pictures to 
either the left or right hemisphere through the use of 
special contact lenses which restricted vision to the half 
field. Films presented to the left half field (right hemi-
sphere) were rated more negatively, which suggested that 
the right hemisphere is biased towards a negative evalu-
ation of incoming stimuli. Ultimately, differential activa-
tion research was needed to begin supporting positive 
versus negative hemispheric contributions. Davidson 
et  al. (1979) asked participants to continuously indicate 
their emotional responses to television programs. Left 
frontal activation was observed during positive affect and 
right frontal activity was observed during negative affect. 
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Similarly, results were replicated when participants were 
asked to generate thoughts and feelings associated with 
positive or negative experiences. Consistency regarding 
these differential hemispheric specializations began to 
accumulate through studies of frontal activation (Ahern 
and Schwartz 1985; Jacobs and Snyder 1996; Tomarken 
et al. 1992).
Following the establishment of the valence model, 
theoretical bases followed from the findings of many 
researchers. These researchers sought possible explana-
tions as to why the left and right hemispheres would be 
specialized for different emotions. One such explanation 
posited that negative emotions are linked with survival 
(Borod et al. 1986), whereas positive emotions are more 
linguistic and communicative (Borod et  al. 1981). The 
notion of the left hemisphere pertaining to verbal com-
munication and pleasantness carried the Valence Model 
into research on approach/withdrawal behaviors (David-
son 1984; Davidson et al. 1990; Fox 1991). However, the 
original predictions of the valence model were not lost. 
Tucker and Frederick (1989) expanded the valence model 
into the balance model of emotion.
While Heilman et al. (1993) had primarily looked at the 
effects of cerebral lesions, Tucker and Frederick (1989) 
discussed the effects of relative cerebral activation on 
emotions. The balance model provided a basis for deacti-
vation of a particular hemisphere secondary to inhibitory 
influences of the homologous frontal lobe. Decreased 
activation of one hemisphere is posited to result in rela-
tive activation of the opposite hemisphere. Therefore, rel-
ative deactivation of the right cerebrum is said to result 
in increased relative activation of the left cerebrum which 
results in an increase of positive emotion. Similarly, rela-
tive deactivation of the left cerebrum is said to result in 
an increase of negative emotion. With this extension to 
the valence model, the balance model provides a frame-
work for including deactivation of a functional cerebral 
system as an inherent part of emotion and arousal, 
thereby suggesting the need for a balance in these pro-
cesses. Specifically, according the model, activation and 
deactivation occurs as a result of the system attempting 
to balance itself (Tucker 1981a, 1981b; see Mollet and 
Harrison 2006; Shenal et al. 2003 for reviews).
While the field was somewhat divided between the 
right hemisphere model and the valence/balance models, 
Silberman and Weingartner (1986) discussed the right 
hemisphere’s role in mediating negative emotions and the 
left hemisphere’s role in mediating positive emotions in a 
thorough review of the literature. The authors described 
that the right hemisphere would “retain dominance 
for controlling the balance between positive and nega-
tive affects, thereby controlling overall emotional tone” 
(p. 343). They suggested that there is not a true balance 
between the left and right hemispheres, likely due to the 
right hemisphere’s specialization for regulating cortical 
arousal, which is integral to emotion modulation (e.g., 
Papousek et  al. 2009). Additionally, the review revealed 
that the field lacked the research needed to test the two 
hypotheses.
More recent studies have also provided support for the 
Balance Model. For example, massage therapy has been 
shown to decrease stress and increase left frontal activa-
tion on EEG (Diego et  al. 2004), suggesting that reduc-
ing negative affect or increasing positive affect is related 
to left frontal activation. Additionally, participants with 
greater left frontal activation show an increased posi-
tive reaction to exercise when compared to those with 
greater right frontal activation (Petruzzello et  al. 2001). 
Other studies of EEG have suggested that greater left 
frontal activation is associated with positive affect, 
whereas greater right frontal activation is associated with 
negative affect (Davidson 1995; Tomarken et  al. 1990). 
Despite these findings, very few researchers have sought 
to address the assumptions of the Balance Model, espe-
cially when compared to the plethora of research specifi-
cally targeting the newer models of valence. Researchers 
pursuing subsequent models have provided a whole host 
of findings regarding relative activation, and the related 
homologous processes of the left and right hemispheres. 
These homologues will be revisited later throughout this 
paper. However, the result of this shift towards newer 
models of differential hemispheric activation is that the 
concept of “balance” has not been thoroughly assessed.
Also relevant to these discussions, the modified valence 
hypothesis (MVH) might be considered as a compromise 
between the right hemisphere model and the valence 
model. The MVH assumes a central role of inhibi-
tory intra- and inter-hemispheric connections, which 
appears central to the discussions of our present mod-
els. Although it has not received much attention (David-
son 1984), more recently it has received partial support 
through an fMRI project (Killgore and Yurgelun-Todd 
2007). In this project the models were tested, where the 
right posterior regions was found to activate to emotional 
face perception, irrespective of affective valence, albeit 
with greater activation to negative facial cues. Though 
less activated to emotional faces, the left posterior region 
appeared to recruit bilateral anterior brain regions in 
what the author’s describe as a valence-specific manner. 
The authors provide evidence for the concurrent opera-
tion of aspects of both of the models and they conclude 
that these two rival theories may not actually be in oppo-
sition, but that they may alternatively reflect different fac-
ets of a complex distributed emotion processing system.
Finally, we should mention the negative-only valence 
hypothesis (Najt et  al. 2013), as well as the asymmetric 
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inhibition model (Grimshaw and Carmel 2014). Beyond 
these newer developments, the reader might find the 
rather vast literature on split-brain patients to be helpful 
(e.g., Sperry 1961, 1982). Seminal studies on split-brain 
patients (e.g., LeDoux et al. 1977; Gazzaniga and LeDoux 
1978; Sperry et al. 1979) and recent evidence might all be 
useful in understanding the present models (e.g., Prete 
et al. 2015).
Activation theories
Following the valence and balance models, many 
researchers began reporting on the mechanisms that 
could be explained from these models through studies 
of brain activation. A new era of research emerged to 
test the behavioral correlates of activation of a particu-
lar hemisphere, and with advancements in methodologi-
cal techniques, EEG usage became more prominent and 
fMRI usage emerged. Therefore the field adopted new 
terminology, where arousal and emotion were studied 
through activation states, which could be inferred from 
cortical desynchrony on the EEG and metabolic incre-
ments on the fMRI. Such studies led researchers to pro-
pose that the left anterior cerebrum processes positive 
emotional expression and that the right anterior cere-
brum processes negative emotional expression (Davidson 
1992a; Kinsbourne and Bemporad 1984). Positive emo-
tional states have been associated with left hemisphere 
activity and negative emotional states have been associ-
ated with right hemisphere activity in a large collection 
of studies (Davidson and Fox 1982; Davidson and Hen-
riques 2000; Davidson et al. 1979; Ekman and Davidson 
1993; Ekman et  al. 1990; Fox and Davidson 1988; Lee 
et  al. 2004; Reuter-Lorenz and Davidson 1981; Schaffer 
et  al. 1983; Sutton and Davidson 2000; Tomarken et  al. 
1992; Wheeler et  al. 1993). For example, when asked to 
report emotional responses while watching a television 
program, EEG recordings demonstrated left hemisphere 
activity during positive emotional states, and right hemi-
sphere activity during negative emotional states (David-
son et  al. 1979). Similarly, infants have been observed 
to yield greater relative left frontal activity in response 
to viewing happy faces, and greater relative right frontal 
activity in response to viewing sad faces (Davidson and 
Fox 1982).
As theories of lateralized activation developed to 
explain emotion, further homologues between the left 
and right hemispheres were explored. During this era of 
research, additional models arose to account for the dif-
ferences in relative activation that occur across broad cat-
egories of behavior. While a detailed explanation of all of 
these models is beyond the scope of the current review, 
the major contributions of such activation research will 
be noted. For example, dimensions such as motivation 
and behavioral approach/avoidance were a significant 
part of the activation literature, and led to the approach-
withdrawal model. Davidson (1984) proposed that ante-
rior left hemisphere activation was involved in social 
approach behaviors and that anterior right hemisphere 
activation was involved in social avoidance behaviors 
(see also Davidson et  al. 1990; Davidson and Tomarken 
1989; Fox and Davidson 1987, 1988; Carver and Harmon-
Jones 2009). There is a great deal of overlap between 
emotional valence and social approach, as many negative 
emotions elicit withdrawal behavior and many positive 
emotions elicit approach behavior (Davidson 1995; How-
ever, see Carver and Harmon-Jones 2009). Therefore, 
Davidson and colleagues offered an explanation that the 
left and right frontal lobes were specialized for process-
ing approach and withdrawal behaviors, respectively. 
Davidson et  al. (1990) showed participants videos that 
were designed to elicit approach by inducing happiness 
or withdrawal by inducing disgust. When viewing the 
disgusting film, a significant shift toward greater relative 
right frontal activation was observed, as well as greater 
relative right anterior temporal arousal.
Consistent findings have been demonstrated for the 
expression of positive approach and negative with-
drawal behaviors. Ekman and Davidson (1993) found that 
greater left hemisphere activation was associated more 
with the voluntary facial expression of a “Duchenne” or 
real smile, than the expression of a social or fake smile. 
These results suggest that the production of approach 
related expressions are also lateralized. More recent 
research supports the notion that withdrawal related 
facial expressions such as fear and disgust are associ-
ated with relatively less left frontal activation (Coan et al. 
2001). Baseline frontal asymmetry has also been used as 
an indicator of approach and withdrawal tendencies. Fox 
et  al. (1995) found that children who had a greater left 
frontal activation at baseline exhibited more social ini-
tiation and positive affect, whereas children with greater 
right frontal activation at baseline tended to remain 
more isolated. Resting frontal asymmetry has also been 
reported to be related to affective style in the adult popu-
lation (Davidson 1992a, b, 1993, 1995).
Another important set of homologues between the left 
and right hemispheres are the differences in the types of 
information processing specialization and their process-
ing styles. The left hemisphere is said to process informa-
tion in a sequential, analytic manner, whereas the right 
hemisphere uses a simultaneous holistic style of process-
ing (Bradshaw and Nettleton 1981).The left hemisphere 
is widely known for rapid, impersistent processing with 
a specialization for logical, linguistic speech, while the 
right hemisphere is widely known for slow, persistent 
processing with a specialization for spatial information 
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such as faces and places. These differences in processing 
style further support approach and withdrawal models. 
For example, the fine motor control of the left frontal 
lobe may be useful in sequential social approach behav-
ior, whereas the more global and automatic gross motor 
control of the right frontal lobe is useful in social with-
drawal behaviors (Davidson 1984).
Along with the presentation of the approach/with-
drawal model, the BIS/BAS model was proposed (Gray 
1982). According to this model the behavioral activation 
system (BAS) activates behavior to conditioned stim-
uli to gain reinforcement or to avoid punishment, and 
the behavioral inhibition system (BIS) inhibits behav-
ior to novel stimuli. Unlike the approach/withdrawal 
model, The BIS/BAS model places approach and active 
avoidance behaviors within the same system. For many 
researchers, this model provides a better explanation of 
the systems involved during frontal activation than the 
approach/withdrawal model (see Demaree et  al. 2005, 
for a review). This stems from the issue that emotions 
of the same valence (positive or negative) do not always 
result in the same motivational behaviors (approach 
or withdrawal). For example, anger, when viewed as a 
tendency, may have an approach component, whereas 
fear is more likely to have a withdrawal component 
(Harmon-Jones et  al. 2010; see also Carver and Har-
mon-Jones 2009). Research has supported that BAS 
scores are associated with left frontal activation (Har-
mon-Jones and Allen 1997; Sutton and Davidson 1997), 
whereas BIS scores are associated with right frontal 
activation (Sutton and Davidson 1997). However, incon-
sistent findings have led researchers to suggest that the 
two systems must be viewed on a continuum, where rel-
ative activation of one system and relative deactivation 
of the other system might be equally involved in emo-
tion related behavior (Beauchaine 2001; Cox and Har-
rison 2008).
In addition to studies of approach and avoidance, 
researchers found hemispheric differences in autonomic 
arousal. Specifically, left hemisphere activation involves 
parasympathetic tone, whereas right hemisphere acti-
vation involves sympathetic tone (Carmona et  al. 2009; 
Demaree and Harrison 1997; Herridge et al. 1997, 2004; 
Wittling 1990; Wittling and Genzel 1995; Wittling et  al. 
1998a, b; see Harrison 2015). As the right hemisphere 
is responsible for mediating arousal, vigilance, and out-
ward-directed attention (Heilman 1995) and is activated 
by emotional situations of negative valence (Davidson 
1995), it must also initiate and control the physiological 
stress mechanisms that occur with such events (Wittling 
1997a). Wittling (1990) found that systolic and diastolic 
blood pressure increased significantly more when pre-
senting a positively valenced emotional film to the right 
hemisphere than when presenting the same film to the 
left hemisphere. Similarly, Zamrini et al. (1990) examined 
epilepsy patients and found that heart rate increased fol-
lowing inactivation of the left hemisphere via intracar-
toid sodium amobarbital injection, whereas heart rate 
decreased following inactivation of the right hemisphere. 
Sensory stimulation of the right hemisphere has been 
found to increase cortisol secretion, whereas left hemi-
sphere stimulation did not have an effect on cortisol lev-
els (Wittling and Schweiger 1993).
Active and dynamic processes
Shortly after the large body of research on the differen-
tial activation of hemispheric systems and frontal systems 
was established, another important concept was pre-
sented. Fox’s (1994) dynamic brain activity and emotion 
regulation model describes the anterior frontal regions 
as dynamic, active, and in opposition to each other. This 
new approach to hemispheric asymmetry emphasized 
the emotion and arousal systems as an active functional 
cerebral system, rather than a system to be activated. Fox 
described that changes in dysphoric affect could result 
from either right-sided excitation or left-sided inhibition. 
Additionally, he noted that one hemisphere may inhibit 
the affect-related behaviors of the other hemisphere. As a 
result, Fox concluded that notions of activity in one hem-
isphere versus activity in another hemisphere are inad-
equate ways to describe the dynamic changes within the 
brain; and when attempting to explain the role of hemi-
spheric specialization, it is important to take into account 
this dynamic interaction.
The term “dynamic” had previously been used when 
describing the interactions between the left and right 
hemispheres (Tucker and Williamson 1984). However, 
the potential value of this construct did not appear to 
greatly influence the literature at the time. This is likely 
because Tucker and colleagues did not explain the role 
of dynamic interplay across the multiple methodological 
approaches to studying hemispheric specialization. Addi-
tionally, the role of dynamic interplay was not explained 
without making reference to the concept of “balance”. 
Specifically, Tucker and Williamson (1984) suggested 
that emotional processes dynamically regulate cognitive 
function through activation and arousal systems, yet bal-
ance was a fundamental assumption in their presentation 
of these systems. Davidson (1987) also reported on the 
dynamic interplay between the frontal regions through 
models of approach and avoidance behaviors. Despite 
previous failed attempts within the dense activation lit-
erature, Fox successfully integrated these findings and 
presented a model emphasizing the importance of this 
dynamic interplay between the two active and opposi-
tional cerebral hemispheres.
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Evidence for the dynamics between hemispheres can be 
traced back to early research on the emotional reaction 
that typically follows unilateral brain damage, as dynam-
ics are represented through the ongoing communica-
tion and inhibitory processes of the two hemispheres. 
One such line of research comes from performing the 
WADA test on epilepsy patients. Sodium amytal was 
often injected into the carotid artery as an ipsilateral 
transient hemispheric anesthetic. Anesthesia of the right 
hemisphere has been characterized by a euphoric reac-
tion, whereas anesthesia of the left hemisphere results 
in dysphoria (Lee et  al. 1990). The emotional changes 
that were observed in patients following the WADA test 
have been interpreted to be the result of the release of 
one hemisphere from the inhibitory control of the other 
hemisphere. Similar conclusions have been drawn from 
studies of patients with unilateral brain damage. It has 
been argued that damage in one hemisphere releases the 
activity of the other hemisphere (Robinson et  al. 1984). 
Sackeim et al. (1982) reported a greater probability of left 
hemisphere damage being associated with pathological 
crying, and right hemisphere damage being associated 
with pathological laughter.
In light of the ongoing communication between the left 
and right hemispheres, Fox (1994) argued that research 
on cerebral lateralization must take into consideration 
the dynamic interactions when explaining hemispheric 
specialization for emotion and emotion regulation. More 
recently, other researchers have acknowledged that the 
brain is an active and dynamic system. While describing 
a model of inhibition and sensitization, Thayer and Fried-
man (2002) argued that healthy biological systems do not 
function at an equilibrium or homeostatic state. Dynamic 
systems were said to consist of interconnections between 
subsystems, which allows them to work together in a 
coordinated fashion. Foster et  al. (2008) discussed the 
dynamic system in the brain by stating that “activation or 
deactivation in one area of the brain may have specific, 
cascading interhemispheric and intrahemispheric effects 
on distal regions” (p. 2847). Similarly, Demaree et  al. 
(2005) found evidence supporting a dynamic activation of 
the left and right hemispheres as a function of emotion. 
In a dichotic listening study, high hostile participants 
were found to have enhanced left ear detections, whereas 
low hostile participants were found to have enhanced 
right ear detections (Demaree and Harrison 1997) as a 
dynamic response to a painful event (cold pressor). EEG 
and fMRI research has also revealed the importance of 
dynamic interplay in behavioral control functions such as 
inhibition, task monitoring, and error detection (Garavan 
et  al. 2002). Additionally, the ability of the frontal lobes 
to regulate information across domains such as emotion 
and cognition has been recognized as a dynamic filtering 
process (Rule et al. 2002; Shimamura 2000). Despite these 
more recent inclusions, the concept of a homeostatic 
brain is still prominent, and dynamic intercommunica-
tion has continued to be minimally acknowledged within 
the emotion and arousal literatures.
Another key concept of the dynamic brain activity and 
emotion regulation model (Fox 1994) is an appreciation 
of past findings that evidence the frontal regions as being 
regulatory over emotional behaviors. Fox posited that 
emotion regulation is a function of the dynamic inter-
play between the anterior regions of the left and right 
hemispheres. The model describes the posterior regions 
as responsible for evoking emotions, and the frontal 
regions as responsible for modulating emotions. This 
dual function is a product of the role that emotions play 
in our lives, as emotions need to be evoked and modu-
lated. Therefore, the systems that evoke emotions are in 
opposition to the systems that modulate these emotions. 
For example, Tucker (1993) hypothesized that increased 
right frontal arousal represents increased inhibition of 
the right posterior region. Within the lesion literature, 
individuals with prefrontal lesions tend to be impulsive 
and poorly emotionally regulated (Kolb and Taylor 1990; 
Rolls et al. 1994; Tucker et al. 1995). Emotion regulation 
has also been linked to the developmental changes that 
take place in the frontal lobes during infancy (Dawson 
et al. 1992), and emotional control is reported to increase 
with age (Gross et al. 1997).
Additional models such as the circumplex model of 
emotion (Heller 1993) and the quadrant model of emo-
tion (Shenal et  al. 2003; Foster et  al. 2008) have been 
developed to further explain the intrahemispheric and 
interhemispheric relationships between these dynamic 
oppositional systems. Such models propose that a dys-
function in any single hemispheric quadrant (left frontal, 
right frontal, left posterior or right posterior) will result 
in a change in all other quadrants. For example, frontal 
lobe dysfunction will result in decreased regulatory abil-
ity, leading to increased activation of the ipsilateral pos-
terior region. This view of emotion regulation supports 
the functional cerebral systems approach, where the third 
functional unit (frontal lobes) is regulatory over the first 
(brainstem) and second (parietal, occipital, and tempo-
ral regions) functional units. It should be noted however, 
that the regulatory capacity of these systems controlling 
emotion is limited (e.g., Carmona et  al. 2009; Holland 
et al. 2012, 2014; Klineburger and Harrison 2015; Mitch-
ell and Harrison 2010; see Harrison 2015).
Capacity model
We have proposed that frontal brain regions have limited 
capacity for regulatory control over oppositional neural 
systems. This defined capacity is viewed as dynamic and 
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variable, whereas in the strictest sense the system might 
be viewed as working optimally in the presence of a sin-
gle, low intensity emotional event or processing demand. 
In contrast, the system might degrade in capacity and 
even fail in regulatory control with multiple concurrent 
or sequential emotional events or subsequent to emo-
tional events of heightened intensity or saliency. There-
fore, frontal activation, whether it be through a shift in 
electrical activity (e.g., qEEG) or through increments in 
metabolic activity (e.g., fMRI or PET), is not unlimited. 
We have proposed that when capacity is exceeded, the 
system shuts down. This capacity model (e.g., Carmona 
et  al. 2009; Holland et  al. 2012, 2014; Klineburger and 
Harrison 2015; Mitchell and Harrison 2010, see Harrison 
2015) may also be at the forefront of providing an expla-
nation for long term neurocognitive damage resulting 
from the depletion within the system.
Within the neuropsychological framework of hostility, 
high hostile men have exhibited dysregulation of right cer-
ebral systems, yielding an exaggerated sympathetic stress 
response through cardiovascular reactivity. For example, 
Foster et al. (2008) found that the right frontal lobe of high 
hostile individuals is unable to inhibit the right posterior 
region that regulates sympathetic activity when exposed to 
situational stressors. Specifically, when exposed to a cold 
pressor task involving the left hand (right hemisphere), 
heart rate and blood pressure increased in response to the 
stress. These individuals also evidenced decreased activ-
ity of the right frontal lobe and higher activity in the right 
posterior region on qEEG measures. Similarly, completion 
of nonverbal fluency tests, which is mediated by the right 
frontal lobe, has been shown to yield heightened systolic 
blood pressure in high hostile individuals (Williamson 
and Harrison 2003). When compared to low hostile men, 
high hostile men demonstrated interference effects on the 
task by committing more perseverative and organizational 
errors along with the increased systolic blood pressure. 
From a functional cerebral systems approach, this suggests 
that the frontal lobes have a “limited capacity” for regulat-
ing the posterior regions, while also mediating other fron-
tal functions.
The cold pressor stimulus has been a useful stressor 
within the dual task paradigm. Demaree and Harrison 
(1997) administered an auditory dichotic listening test 
before and after the cold pressor. Following the stressor, 
high hostile men had increased blood pressure, heart 
rate, and correctly identified more single syllable word 
sounds at the left ear. The increase in right cerebral acti-
vation in high hostile men occurred with a corresponding 
increase in sympathetic tone. Increased arousal levels and 
heightened left ear advantage are indicative of increased 
right cerebral activation in high hostile men. Low hos-
tiles showed lowered heart rate and blood pressure as 
well as a heightened right ear advantaged, demonstrating 
increased left cerebral activation to the stressor.
In the visual modality, hostile men and women were 
instructed to identify faces as angry, happy, or neutral, in 
either the right or left visual field (Harrison and Gorel-
czenko 1990). Hostile men and women were shown to 
have faster affect perception and negative perceptual 
bias, restricted to the left visual field. A replication of this 
experiment with the addition of the cold pressor found 
that hostile men demonstrated decreased accuracy in the 
recognition of emotional faces within the left visual field, 
while hostile men performed symmetrically across both 
visual fields.
More recent approaches within the dual task paradigm 
have used verbal and nonverbal fluency measures as fron-
tal lobe stressors. The Controlled Oral Word Association 
Test (COWAT), a measure of verbal fluency or word gen-
erativity, has been shown to be sensitive to left frontal 
functioning (Benton and de Hamsher 1976), whereas the 
Ruff Figural Fluency Test (RFFT), a measure of nonverbal 
fluency or figural generativity, has been shown to be sen-
sitive to right frontal functioning (Demakis and Harrison 
1997; Foster et  al. 2005). As noted above, Williamson 
and Harrison (2003) asked high and low hostile men to 
complete both of these lateralized frontal stressors, while 
evaluating cardiovascular reactivity. Results indicated 
that in hostile men, systolic blood pressure increased fol-
lowing the nonverbal stressor (RFFT), whereas systolic 
blood pressure decreased following the verbal stressor 
(COWAT). The authors found these results to be consist-
ent with the capacity model (e.g., Carmona et  al. 2009; 
Holland et al. 2012, 2014; Klineburger and Harrison 2015; 
Mitchell and Harrison 2010, see Harrison 2015), suggest-
ing that the frontal regions were unable to regulate blood 
pressure with the concurrent demand of the stressor task.
To continue this line of research, Williamson et  al. 
(Williamson, Harrison, Walters: The influence of lateral-
ized stressors on cardiovascular regulation and dichotic 
listening in hostile men, in preparation) looked at the 
influence of hostility on cardiovascular regulation, ver-
bal and nonverbal fluency, and dichotic listening. Blood 
pressure and heart rate measures were taken in high and 
low hostile men before and after verbal fluency tasks. It 
was predicted that high hostile men would exhibit cardi-
ovascular activation subsequent to the nonverbal stressor 
but not the verbal stressor, indicating a diminished right 
frontal capacity. It was also predicted that high hostile 
men would exhibit a priming effect through a heightened 
left ear bias on the dichotic listening test following the 
nonverbal fluency task, but not the verbal fluency task. 
Consistent with predictions, high hostile men showed an 
increase in blood pressure when compared to baseline 
and low hostile men; they produced more perseverative 
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errors on the task than low hostile men; and they dis-
played a priming effect at the left ear during the nonver-
bal fluency condition.
Similarly, high hostile men have been shown to have 
significantly higher blood glucose levels subsequent to 
the nonverbal stressor when compared to the verbal 
stressor (Walters and Harrison 2006b). This suggests that 
high hostile individuals are unable to concurrently regu-
late their glucose levels, while concurrently processing a 
right frontal lobe stressor. When considering these find-
ings in light of the right hemisphere model, there should 
be a diminished capacity of the right frontal lobe to regu-
late the posterior systems of the right hemisphere (Wal-
ters and Harrison 2006b; Williamson and Harrison 2003; 
Williamson, Harrison, Walters: The influence of lateral-
ized stressors on cardiovascular regulation and dichotic 
listening in hostile men, in preparation).
This capacity model is an extension of Kinsbourne’s 
functional cerebral space model (Kinsbourne 1980; Kins-
bourne and Hicks 1978). Kinsbourne (1980) described 
that the cerebral systems share an organization net-
work, and for this reason, dual tasks create interference 
effects, which are evidenced by a decline on concurrent 
task performance. Kinsbourne essentially extended the 
functional cerebral systems approach by addressing the 
notion of cerebral activation under challenging condi-
tions. According to the model, the amount of interfer-
ence on the concurrent performance of multiple tasks 
will depend on how related the tasks are and how close 
the involved cerebral networks are in physical space to 
each other. If the tasks are similar, and require networks 
that are in close proximity, performance will be enhanced 
through the ability to share networks. However if the 
tasks are dissimilar, but require the same networks, per-
formance will be impaired due to the functional demands 
placed on these networks. As these functional demands 
increase, the cerebral capacity decreases and may be 
exceeded under extreme stress.
Interference is not the only assumption of the func-
tional cerebral space model, as it also states that dual-
task performance can be enhanced when tasks draw on 
resources from the same hemisphere (Hiscock and Kins-
bourne 1977; Yazgan et  al. 1995). When studying facial 
affect recognition, Root et al. (2006) presented emotional 
faces to both cerebral hemispheres, and had participants 
respond with either the left or the right hand. Results 
showed that reaction times were faster when the hemi-
sphere processing the emotion and the response hand 
were congruent. Therefore, the right hand was found to 
be faster for responding to positive emotions, and the left 
hand was faster for responding to negative emotions.
As discussed earlier, the specific application of frontal 
lobe stress to high hostile individuals has continued to 
suggest a limited capacity of the frontal lobes through 
dysregulation of sympathetic arousal (Carmona et  al. 
2008; Mitchell and Harrison 2010; Walters and Harri-
son 2006a, b; Walters and Harrison: Frontal regulation of 
blood glucose levels as a function of hostility, submitted; 
Williamson and Harrison 2003). While limited capacity 
is a product of the dual task paradigm, when considering 
Tucker and Williamson’s (1984) balance model, limited 
capacity may also be a product of these functional cer-
ebral systems being oppositional to each other. For exam-
ple, the affective valence differences between the left and 
right hemispheres put these systems in opposition to 
each other.
Opponent process theory
The association of oppositional processes in biological 
functioning is not without historical precedence. Hera-
clitus’ philosophy stated that all things are comprised 
of a pair of opposites (Bakalis 2005). This view was sub-
sequently continued by Hegel and later by Marx (Stalin 
1940). The concept was expanded into psychology, when 
Hurvich and Jameson (1957) proposed the opponent 
process theory to describe color vision. The most influ-
ential expansion of this theory followed shortly thereaf-
ter when the theory was used to explain concepts such 
as neural organization (Hurvich and Jameson 1974), 
emotion (Solomon and Corbit 1974), motivation (Solo-
mon 1980), and addiction (Solomon and Corbit 1973). 
At its birth, the opponent process theory was a neu-
ropsychological theory. It can be argued that opponent 
processes are prototypical representations of neurologi-
cal processes. However, over recent decades the theory 
has been largely excluded or omitted from neuropsycho-
logical models.
While the opponent process theory was a psychologi-
cal and neurological model proposed to account for a 
wide range of behaviors, emotion has been one of the 
most popular concepts explained by the theory. The 
theory asserts that processes (i.e. emotions) are paired, 
and when one emotion in a pair is experienced, the 
other is suppressed. In other words, if fear and pleas-
ure are paired, when experiencing fear, pleasure is sup-
pressed. These pairs are made up of the A-process or 
primary process, and the B-process or opponent process. 
The primary process and opponent process remain at a 
level of neutrality until the primary process is activated 
by some emotional event. In order to have evidence of 
an opponent process, something must be presented (i.e. 
emotional stimulus) and something must be taken away 
(i.e. emotional stimulus removed). The primary process 
responds to the demands confronting the organism such 
as the presence of the emotional event, yet the oppo-
nent process is slower to activate. This temporal delay in 
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activation of the opponent process allows the emotion 
paired with the primary process to be experienced. If the 
emotional event is negative, then fear or anger might be 
experienced. To prevent the level of fear from becom-
ing too great, the opponent process activates to suppress 
the primary process. At this point, the level of fear may 
diminish slightly, but does not return to baseline levels. 
According to the theory, a homeostasis is reached until 
the event changes or the process comes to an end.
The theory predicts a reaction in the opposite direc-
tion (pleasure) after the primary process (fear) has been 
reduced through habituation or other mechanisms. 
Once the emotional event ends, the primary process 
withdraws, yet the opponent process is slower to with-
draw. This results in a residual feeling of pleasure shortly 
after experiencing fear. With repeated presentations, 
the opponent process is said to activate with heightened 
intensity and prolonged duration. Solomon and Corbit 
(1974) used this theory to account for the feelings of fear 
and pleasure that skydivers experienced; wherein veteran 
skydivers experienced less fear and more pleasure.
At the time of it’s development, the theory was also 
able to account for certain animal learning phenomena 
(Solomon and Corbit 1974), such as imprinting in duck-
lings (Starr 1978), Pavlovian conditioning in dogs (Over-
mier et  al. 1979), and conditioning in rats (Maier et  al. 
1976; Rosellini and Lashley 1982) Another branch of 
the opponent process theory stemmed from this line of 
research and established itself in the classical condition-
ing literature (Schull 1979; Wagner 1981; Wagner and 
Brandon 1989). However this line of research is some-
what removed from the emotional predictions specified 
by Solomon, and is beyond the scope of this review.
Fundamental to opponent process theory is the con-
cept of after-reactions to emotional events. This led early 
researchers to explore the hedonic contrast and affective 
dynamics involved in emotion. For example, Craig and 
Siegel (1979) administered a self report mood inventory 
to college students before and after a course final exam. 
The researchers hypothesized that any negative emotions 
prior to the exam would be followed by positive emotions 
following the exam. Mood ratings revealed that dyspho-
ria decreased reliably and euphoria increased, which the 
authors interpreted to be in support of opponent process 
theory.
In another empirical test of oppositional emotions, 
Mauro (1988) hypnotized participants and led them to 
associate happiness and sadness with randomly assigned 
colored lights as stimuli. Additional colors were ran-
domly assigned for after-sad and after-happy phases of 
the experiment. Physiological and self-report measures 
were taken before and during the presentation of the 
stimuli, while individuals were led to experience joy and 
sadness presented in a quasi-random order to control for 
expectancy effects. Heart rate and EMG (corrugator and 
zygomatic) data revealed that participants experienced 
sadness subsequent to joy, but did not experience joy 
subsequent to sadness. The authors concluded that emo-
tions involving more intense physiological processes such 
as fear and joy are needed to observe the after-reaction, 
because the after-reaction is a product of the opponent 
process being unable to compensate for the sudden with-
drawal of the primary process. In situations such as sad-
ness, where physiological processes are less intense, the 
primary process decreases slowly, which might allow the 
opponent process to compensate, thus no after-reaction 
is observed. Given this interpretation, it logically follows 
that induced depression has also given researchers diffi-
culty when attempting to observe after-reactions (Ranieri 
and Zeiss 1984).
Solomon described the sequence of emotions that he 
observed as “temporal dynamics”. As discussed previ-
ously, the concept of dynamic brain activity has remained 
underappreciated, and the same argument can be made 
for the concept of temporal dynamics. Despite the util-
ity of the theory, especially in light of oppositional emo-
tions, current inclusions of opponent process theory are 
almost nonexistent within the neuropsychological litera-
ture. This could be a result of the difficulties involved in 
designing a valid test of the theory.
For example, not all researchers have been able to sup-
port the opponent process theory. Sandvik et  al. (1985) 
were unable to confirm the prediction that withdrawal 
responses become greater after habituation. Additionally, 
one finding of this study was a withdrawal response in the 
opposite direction than that which the theory predicts. 
Participants were required to listen to a story imple-
menting imaginal exposure of good events or bad events 
across the domains of job situations, relationships, and 
other domains. Following these passages, participants 
rated their emotions using self report measures on which 
happy and unhappy were choices along a Likert scale. 
As previously mentioned, emotions that involve intense 
physiological processes are needed to observe after-
reactions. Not only does “unhappy” lack the intensity 
required of this paradigm, but theoretically, oppositional 
emotions are not representing a continuous process, and 
should not be measured on a continuum. Furthermore, 
physiological measures are also essential to this type of 
research. In a review of the literature, Merckelbach et al. 
(1991) found that there was optimistic evidence for the 
theory. While empirical findings of studies were not une-
quivocally supportive of the theory, the methodological 
difficulties of this type of research were noted.
A more recent integration of opponent process the-
ory tested the predictions of valence reversal following 
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emotional stimuli using EEG. Kline et  al. (2007) pre-
sented aversive images to participants and subsequently 
presented neutral images for a recovery phase. It was 
hypothesized that the affective contrast would be dis-
played in the asymmetrical activity patterns of the fron-
tal lobes. Specifically, alpha activity, which is inversely 
related to the activation of the corresponding brain 
region, was compared across frontal regions. While aver-
sive images did not produce a change in frontal asym-
metry, participants with greater left frontal activity at 
baseline showed increased left frontal activity during the 
recovery phase. The authors concluded that participants 
with greater resting left frontal activation have better reg-
ulatory abilities over negative emotions, and an increase 
in left frontal activation following the aversive stimuli 
supported the concept of a lingering opponent process. 
Additionally, participants with greater relative right fron-
tal activity at baseline show a relative inability to regulate 
negative emotional reactions, which is consistent with 
the literature on right frontal dysfunction.
Recent research of the capacity model yields promising 
evidence for the importance of opponent process theory. 
Solomon and Corbit (1978) also appreciated that the 
physiological resources involved in an opponent process 
system are not unlimited. According to opponent process 
theory, any prolonged or repeated departures from affec-
tive neutrality have a cost. To this effect, prolonged exer-
cise or constant demand might lead to the exhaustion of 
a particular opponent process system. This implication is 
an extension of Selye’s stress theory (Selye 1950), which 
states that stress is broadly anything that sets into motion 
defense reactions, regardless of whether it is pleasurable 
or aversive.
A proposed integration model for oppositional 
emotion and arousal systems
At the present, there appears to be a basis for looking 
at opponent process theory in light of the oppositional 
roles of the left and right hemispheres. We propose that 
the integration of opponent process theory and arousal/
activation theory converges on four mechanisms. The 
first mechanism, arousal, is essential for the experience 
of any intense emotion. Therefore arousal systems must 
be incorporated into any functional cerebral systems 
model of emotion. The second mechanism is the right 
hemisphere’s specialization for threat detection and sym-
pathetic response. The hemisphere that is specialized for 
these processes will be critical for evoking emotions and 
survival responses. The third mechanism lies in the dif-
ferences in processing styles of the two hemispheres. As 
the right hemisphere activates through recruitment and 
persists longer than the left hemisphere, the emotions 
of the right hemisphere will be longer in duration than 
those of the left hemisphere (see Harrison 2015, Chap-
ter 27). The fourth mechanism is the limited capacity of 
the systems involved in emotion and arousal processes, 
as oppositional systems may be depleted, resulting in 
deregulated affect.
While referencing a previous presentation, Tucker 
(1981a, b) described the two hemispheres in a man-
ner consistent with opponent process theory, stating 
that “the two hemispheres seem to exist in some sort of 
reciprocally balancing, dialectical relationship with each 
hemisphere’s affective tendency opposing and comple-
menting that of the other (p. 21)”. Tucker also noted that 
the right hemisphere was well connected with the sub-
cortical arousal systems, whereas the left hemisphere 
appeared to exhibit inhibitory control over the right 
hemisphere. Despite this knowledge, Tucker’s balance 
model of emotion does not appreciate the contributions 
of opponent process theory. According to the balance 
model, relative activation in one hemisphere results in 
relative deactivation in the other hemisphere. This theo-
retical view of inhibitory processes arriving with activa-
tion in one hemisphere over activation processes within 
the homologous hemispheric regions may be criticized 
on a somewhat simplistic view of these neural systems. 
Should opponent process theory be accurate, then one 
contribution derived from the proposition of opposi-
tional systems is that activation of the opponent system 
may be fully underway even during periods of maximal 
inhibition from the other system. Arousal theory pro-
vides a basis for this through bottom up and top down 
functional neural anatomy, first identified in the clas-
sic literature where the frontal lobe provides regulatory 
influences over the brainstem reticular activating system 
(Isaac 1960). This anatomy provides for a somewhat dis-
tinct and functionally separate arousal process within 
each cerebral hemisphere. Thus oppositional activation 
may arise somewhat independently within the left cere-
bral hemisphere despite the contralateral influences of an 
activated right cerebral hemisphere and vice versa. This 
view acknowledges that each cerebral hemisphere has 
somewhat distinct and unique arousal systems and pro-
vocative stimuli which may ultimately be oppositional to 
the processes of the other hemisphere.
Although the evidence for differential emotional pro-
cessing is overwhelming, at this point, the largest consist-
ency of evidence supports the right hemisphere model. 
Few researchers doubt the relationship between the right 
hemisphere and arousal/emotion. This fundamental 
inequity in the relationship between the left hemisphere 
and the right hemisphere contributions to these con-
structs requires alteration in the fundamental assump-
tions of the balance model. Specifically the inequity exists 
with an asymmetry in the right hemisphere, where the 
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right hemisphere may be viewed as contributing arousal 
intensity and emotional specificity across all affective 
valences. In contrast, we propose a new model with a 
relative restriction and reduced weight on the “balance” 
scale with the left hemisphere contributions being of low 
arousal level, positive valence, and impersistent in tem-
poral duration.
Also, there appears to be a basis for looking at the right 
hemisphere model again due to the current state of the 
balance model. Just as emotion, arousal, and activation 
were differentially lateralized to the right hemisphere, we 
should have a lateralized opponent process in the right 
hemisphere. When considering that the aforementioned 
arousal and emotion systems are dynamic and opposi-
tional, where the right hemisphere is dominant overall, 
there will not be a true balance among these two brains 
that differ substantially in their processing styles. Just as 
spatial processing theory (Heilman and Valenstein 2003) 
posits that the right hemisphere is specialized in process-
ing spatial information that is bilateral in origin, whereas 
the left hemisphere is restricted in processing minimal 
spatial information from the right hemispace. This same 
broad specialization of the right hemisphere for recog-
nizing external threats in bilateral hemispace provides a 
fundamental compartmentalization for threat detection 
and comprehension of emotional events. We argue here 
that the same imbalance is necessary so that negative 
affective threat would persist indefinitely within the brain 
systems specialized for comprehending and responding 
to these potentially vital events, whereas the left brain 
contributes minimally to these processes, but instead to 
a rapid, sequential, linguistic, and positive demeanor of 
short temporal duration or brief in its persistence.
From the activation literature, we also have evidence 
that the left hemisphere is a rapid, sequential, and imper-
sistent processor devoted to logical linguistic processing; 
in contrast, the right hemisphere is a slow, evolutionar-
ily vital system, arranged to persist in its evaluation of 
potential threat or negative affective import. Thus, the 
two hemispheres can never be in balance under condi-
tions of threat or coercion, and a relative dominance of 
the right hemisphere should exist. For survival, the nega-
tive emotions of the right hemisphere need to persist, 
whereas the positive emotions of the left hemisphere 
may be less persistent. Therefore, we propose a theoreti-
cal basis biased towards negative emotions, with dynamic 
activation of the left brain mediating the arousal and 
negative affect of the right brain. This is vital in situations 
of coercion or threat. We draw on this premise a funda-
mental assertion that the balance model is not truly bal-
anced. One purpose of the present paper is to expose a 
potentially fundamental flaw in the balance model, where 
there cannot be balance between two oppositional states 
differing in speed and/or persistence of activation within 
these somewhat discrete functional cerebral systems.
To illustrate the difference in these processes, consider 
Aesop’s Fable, “The Tortoise and the Hare”. The tortoise 
is much like the right brain, and is working at full force 
much of the time, slow with its processes but persistent. 
The hare is intermittently working at full force, by being 
rapid with its energetic and sequential processing style, 
but does not persist for long periods of time. Looking 
across the entire race, we have a sense of balance between 
a slow, persistent racer, and a fast, impersistent racer, but 
at any given time, these racers are not truly in balance. 
This is similar to the two brains, where we propose an 
imbalance between these oppositional systems.
Here we propose a dynamic opponent relativity model 
that builds on over five decades of research incorporating 
the unique contributions from the aforementioned theo-
ries and models. This model asserts that each hemisphere 
has an independent arousal system, where the right hem-
isphere is specialized for negative emotion and threat 
detection. Additionally, the systems that involve positive 
and negative emotions are oppositional and active con-
currently. These processes are dynamic, and have limited 
capacity. Taken in unison we have a model of emotion 
that describes the right hemisphere as dominant and for 
survival, and a left hemisphere that is specialized to mini-
mize the effects of these emotions in a logical, sequential, 
analytic, and socially constructive way. When the right 
hemisphere is relatively activated, there should also be an 
undercurrent of the left hemisphere attempting to reduce 
the effects of the emotion.
Staying true to opponent process theory requires the 
assumption that the visible effects of the opponent pro-
cess will emerge following the resurgence of the primary 
process. Activation of a negative emotion such as anger 
may correspond with a buildup of the oppositional sys-
tem, as predicted by opponent process theory. Follow-
ing the withdrawal of the primary system there may be 
a biased post anger state, such as laughter or euphoria. 
When the effects of the primary system have been neu-
tralized, the opponent process has been effective. While 
empirical support for after-reactions has been mixed, it 
should be taken into account that given the specializa-
tion of the right hemisphere, it will be a stronger oppo-
sitional process. As the right hemisphere is involved in 
intense negative emotions, and is designed to persist for 
survival, it will be harder to overtake in situations where 
it is the primary process. Also, in situations where the left 
hemisphere is the primary process, the right hemisphere 
will be better suited to reduce the effects of the primary 
process (see Figure  1). This may explain why research-
ers have found that negative emotion follows positive 
emotion (Mauro 1988), but have not been unanimous in 
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finding euphoric reactions after unpleasant events (Mer-
ckelbach et al. 1991).
As the dynamic opponent relativity model pertains 
to emotion and arousal, the implications to follow will 
mostly consider the right hemisphere to be the primary 
process. Given the specialization and persistence of the 
right hemisphere, it is better suited to restore emotional 
neutrality than the left hemisphere, which is special-
ized in less intense and less persistent positive emotions. 
Therefore, the right hemisphere offers potentially a 
superior opponent process, and is less likely to fail dur-
ing periods of prolonged or intense happiness. While 
reverse configurations can be made, the model will be 
applied in  situations involving negative emotion and 
elevated arousal with implied right hemispheric mecha-
nisms. From a clinical perspective, the greater impor-
tance of this model lies in understanding the mechanisms 
involved during the exposure to aversive stimuli and neg-
ative emotions.
It should also be noted that the time frame over which 
these processes occur depends on the intensity and nov-
elty of the experience. Opponent process theory pre-
dicts that the primary process does not withdraw until 
the emotional event ends (Solomon and Corbit 1973). 
Therefore a low intensity, short duration negative experi-
ence such as briefly viewing an angry face would result 
in a minimal sympathetic increase. These effects might 
be resolved by the opponent process in minutes or even 
seconds. However, more intense and prolonged provo-
cation such as encountering an angry customer for 
15 min would result in significant sympathetic increase. 
Such effects may take hours for the opponent process 
to completely resolve. In these examples, the sustained 
activation of sympathetic tone in response to possible 
threat can be explained by the recruitment and kindling 
phenomena of the right hemisphere (Stuss et  al. 2001; 
Winston et  al. 2002). Functional imaging studies of up-
regulation have found that the right hemisphere recruits 
nearby areas such as the amygdale to activate, and an 
incremental, persistent “kindling effect” is observed 
(Hamann et al. 2002; Ochsner et al. 2004). This effect may 
also suggest that the right frontal lobes have less capac-
ity than the left frontal lobes, as the actions of the right 
hemisphere’s arousal system are more slowly resolved.
In certain situations the opponent process may fail to 
resolve the primary process, as suggested by the lim-
ited capacity evidence. According to classic arousal 
theory, the performance of any function is best at some 
optimal state. This optimal state does not involve rela-
tive activation or arousal of the entire brain, but rather 
relative activation of a functional cerebral system. While 
these oppositional processes are dynamically responsive, 
active, intense and/or prolonged use may deplete the sys-
tem, resulting in the failure of the opponent process. This 
means that one system, such as the right hemisphere, can 
be active, while another system is less active, which leads 
to a dominant negative expression, such as anger. How-
ever, once the opponent process becomes spent, there 
will be a release of the dominant emotion leading to rage 
for anger or terror for fear.
Neurocognitive implications
We have proposed that these frontal systems have lim-
ited capacity for regulatory control over functional neu-
ral systems. Therefore, activation, whether it be through 
a shift in qEEG activity or through increments in meta-
bolic activity, is not unlimited. We have proposed that 
when capacity is exceeded, the system shuts down. This 
Figure 1 Differences in the persistence of activation of the right and left cerebral hemispheres. Emotional neutrality is more difficult to restore with 
repeated successive stimulations of the right hemisphere as opposed to repeated successive stimulations of the left hemisphere.
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capacity model (e.g., Carmona et al. 2009; Holland et al. 
2012, 2014; Klineburger and Harrison 2015; Mitchell 
and Harrison 2010, see Harrison 2015) may also be at 
the forefront of providing an explanation for long term 
neurocognitive damage resulting from the depletion of 
a system. Further understanding of this limited capacity 
may be on the forefront of explaining the anatomical cor-
relates of the brain that are affected by anger disorders, 
depressive disorders, and post traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD).
With normal exposure to an emotional stressor, the 
opponent process is able to resolve the primary process. 
Furthermore, repeated normal exposures strengthen the 
opponent process and lead to an increased tolerance for 
stress. However, with intense or prolonged exposure, the 
opponent process may deplete its resources attempting to 
restore emotional neutrality. When this happens the pri-
mary system is no longer under the inhibitory influence 
of the opponent system, and the frontal lobe is left as the 
only regulatory system. While the frontal lobes are quali-
fied for the regulation of emotion, by receiving sensory 
and motor input (Nauta 1971), as well as sharing connec-
tions with the amygdale (Pandya and Yeterian 1996), the 
literature on hostility has evidenced that the frontal lobes 
also have a limited capacity for stress. Along with the 
depletion of the opponent process, the regulatory frontal 
lobes of the primary process will also be depleted.
In the example of a single event trauma leading to 
PTSD in adults, a victim who is placed under intense and 
prolonged duress may experience startle, fear, feelings 
of helplessness, and even anger. These are all reactions 
and emotions associated with the primary process. If the 
event were intense enough to push the primary system 
too far, the opponent process would deplete its resources 
in an unsuccessful attempt to resolve the primary pro-
cess. The unbridled sympathetic response and negative 
emotion that follows would essentially damage the emo-
tion evoking and emotion regulating systems involved.
Research in PTSD has found evidence for long term 
neurocognitive damage. Specifically, exaggerated amyg-
dale activation has been found in those with PTSD in 
response to traumatic reminders and threat predict-
ing stimuli (Shin et al. 2004). As the amygdala is associ-
ated with fight or flight reactions, we would expect that 
it would activate in the presence of a threat. Similarly, 
Bremner et al. (1999) used PET and found deactivation in 
the medial prefrontal cortex in veterans with PTSD when 
presented with combat-related pictures and sounds. The 
amygdala’s shared connections with the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex allow for regulatory control over the 
threat response, but with limited capacity. Also, combat 
veterans with PTSD have exhibited decreased right hip-
pocampal volumes on MRI (Bremner et al. 1995) as well 
as decreased left and right hippocampal volumes (Gur-
vits et al. 1996) when compared to noncombat veterans 
or combat veterans without PTSD. The hippocampus is 
active in contextual memory, where the left hippocam-
pus is specialized for encoding meaning and the right 
hippocampus is specialized for novelty detection. We 
propose that depleting the resources of the regula-
tory and excitatory systems in these situations is linked 
to such damage in the amygdale, prefrontal cortex, and 
hippocampus.
There is also evidence suggesting that when positive 
stimuli are presented immediately after a negative expe-
rience, cardiovascular recovery occurs faster than in the 
absence of positive stimuli (Fredrickson and Levenson 
1998). Along this line, the current integration may pro-
vide the bases behind verbal cognitive therapies, where 
sequential, linguistic analysis of an emotion may activate 
the left hemisphere system which works in opposition to 
the negative emotional bias of the right brain. This inher-
ently unbalanced–balance model should yield oscillating 
oppositional states due to the temporal differences and 
to the implied limitations in capacity, which should differ 
between the left and right brains. With this new model, 
we now have a system that is “balanced”, but biased 
towards survival.
In the absence of a threat, people spend a great deal of 
time in calm, quiescent states. Research on the “optimism 
bias” supports the notion that parasympathetic states and 
positive thoughts of the future are common and healthy 
(Sharot et  al. 2007). Yet, in  situations where there is an 
imbalance in the system where the right brain becomes 
ruminative and attentional processes are biased towards 
negative experiences, it may be very difficult for the left 
brain to reduce the right brain’s activation. However, 
through verbal therapies we can activate the logical, lin-
guistic left brain. This may provide oppositional inhibi-
tion with a shift in focus towards positive experiences. 
For example, Fredrickson (2001) describes a broaden-
and-build theory that suggests that positive emotions 
broaden one’s thought repertoire, undo lingering negative 
emotions, and build psychological resilience. The cur-
rent model is consistent with such research and expands 
this view to posit that activation of the left hemisphere 
across a wide range of modalities will promote emotional 
well-being. In addition to positive emotion, sympathetic 
reduction, social approach, sequential processing, and 
linguistic speech are all behaviors that activate the left 
hemisphere. In addition to verbal processing, cognitive-
behavioral therapies also implement techniques such 
as deep breathing, progressive muscle relaxation, and 
biofeedback. These exercises focus on reducing sympa-
thetic processes such as heart rate, respiration rate, and 
galvanic skin response, suggesting that efforts to promote 
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parasympathetic processes work in opposition to nega-
tive emotions.
There is reason to believe that regularly engaging in 
activities that strengthen the left hemisphere can act as 
a protective factor against negative emotion. Wittling 
(1997b) suggests that the left hemisphere is primarily 
responsible for modulating processes that help to main-
tain homeostasis, counteract environmental stress, and 
promote restorative processes. At baseline, relative right 
frontal activity has been viewed as a vulnerability marker 
for depression, whereas relative left frontal activity has 
been viewed as a protective factor (Henriques and David-
son 1990, 1991; Roemer et  al. 1992; Gotlib et  al. 1998; 
Nusslock et  al. 2011; Stewart et  al. 2011; Pössel et  al. 
2008; Shenal et  al. 2003; see also Harrison 2015). Indi-
viduals with greater relative left frontal activity may be 
better able to regulate stress responses and emotional 
reactions, resulting in better overall resilience (Kline et al. 
2007). Therefore, continued successful education or posi-
tive social encounters should provide the added value of 
activating the left hemisphere. While the left hemisphere 
is not specialized for survival and is incompetent for 
maintaining safety, increased left hemisphere activation 
may provide a better emotional disposition and decreases 
the risk of the right hemisphere taking over for chronic 
negative valence. As we further our understanding of 
the interdependence of the left and right brains, we pro-
pose that the field will need to shift into neurocognitive-
behavioral therapies in order to benefit from integrated 
treatment approaches.
As previously noted, advances in neuroimaging tech-
niques present new challenges for supporting the 
research that has been built upon over the last five dec-
ades. One such challenge is that newer language leaves 
a disconnection or sense of unrelatedness among those 
contributing to different research areas. Another chal-
lenge is that new lines of research leave older models with 
unequivocal evidence. This integration has shown that 
arousal theory has essentially evolved rather than having 
been left behind. For example, the classic arousal theorist 
would readily adopt the term activation through desyn-
chrony on EEG measures, and the term metabolic rate 
in regard to fMRI measures. Common language is essen-
tial to being able to integrate the findings of researchers 
across multiple approaches.
Conclusions
We have proposed that frontal brain regions have lim-
ited capacity for regulatory control over oppositional 
neural systems. Therefore, frontal activation, whether 
it be through a shift in electrical activity (e.g., qEEG) or 
through increments in metabolic activity (e.g., fMRI 
or PET), is not unlimited. We have proposed that when 
capacity is exceeded, the system shuts down. This Capac-
ity Model (e.g., Carmona et al. 2009; Holland et al. 2012; 
Klineburger and Harrison 2015; Holland et  al. 2014; 
Mitchell and Harrison 2010, see Harrison 2015) may also 
be at the forefront of providing an explanation for long 
term neurocognitive damage resulting from the deple-
tion within the system. Further comprehension of these 
capacity limitations may be at the forefront of explaining 
the anatomical correlates of extreme emotional states, 
where anger, fear, or sad emotional expressions may 
become unbridled with the absence or the removal of 
regulatory control efforts. These discussions appear to 
be intimate to understanding anger disorders, depressive 
disorders, and post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
There is reason to believe that regularly engaging in 
activities that strengthen the left hemisphere can act as 
a protective factor against negative emotion. Wittling 
(1997b) suggests that the left hemisphere is primarily 
responsible for modulating processes that help to main-
tain homeostasis, counteract environmental stress, and 
promote restorative processes. At baseline, relative right 
frontal activity has been viewed as a vulnerability marker 
for depression, whereas relative left frontal activity has 
been viewed as a protective factor (Henriques and David-
son 1990, 1991; Roemer et  al. 1992; Gotlib et  al. 1998; 
see also Harrison 2015). Individuals with greater relative 
left frontal activity may be better able to regulate stress 
responses and emotional reactions, resulting in better 
overall resilience (Kline et al. 2007). Therefore, continued 
successful education or positive social encounters should 
provide the added value of activating the left hemisphere. 
While the left hemisphere is not specialized for survival 
and is incompetent for maintaining safety, increased left 
hemisphere activation may provide a better emotional 
disposition and decreases the risk of the right hemi-
sphere taking over for chronic negative valence. As we 
further our understanding of the interdependence of the 
left and right brains, we propose that the field will need 
to shift into neurocognitive-behavioral therapies in order 
to benefit from integrated treatment approaches.
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